Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Verifying constant-time implementations by abstract interpretation

Sandrine Blazy 1, * David Pichardie 1 Alix Trieu 1
* Corresponding author
1 CELTIQUE - Software certification with semantic analysis
Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique , IRISA-D4 - LANGAGE ET GÉNIE LOGICIEL
Abstract : Constant-time programming is an established discipline to secure programs against timing attackers. Several real-world secure C libraries such as NaCl, mbedTLS, or Open Quantum Safe, follow this discipline. We propose an advanced static analysis, based on state-of-the-art techniques from abstract interpretation, to report time leakage during programming. To that purpose, we analyze source C programs and use full context-sensitive and arithmetic-aware alias analyses to track the tainted flows.We give semantic evidence of the correctness of our approach on a core language. We also present a prototype implementation for C programs that is based on the CompCert compiler toolchain and its companion Verasco static analyzer. We present verification results on various real-world constant-time programs and report on a successful verification of a challenging SHA-256 implementation that was out of scope of previous tool-assisted approaches.
Complete list of metadata

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02025047
Contributor : Alix Trieu <>
Submitted on : Monday, May 17, 2021 - 4:09:25 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, May 18, 2021 - 3:08:47 AM

File

jcs19.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Citation

Sandrine Blazy, David Pichardie, Alix Trieu. Verifying constant-time implementations by abstract interpretation. Journal of Computer Security, IOS Press, 2019, 27 (1), pp.137--163. ⟨10.3233/JCS-181136⟩. ⟨hal-02025047⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

283

Files downloads

84